Tag: <span>Residential Development</span>

“The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated,” Mark Twain once remarked when an overexcited journalist transmuted the illness of a friend Twain was visiting into the fanciful poverty-stricken death of the author.

Many in the P2P industry will know how he feels after the insolvency specialist Damian Webb reheated some leftovers from his AltFi 2019 “State of the Market” article at a recent NARA (Association of Property and Fixed Charge Receivers) conference. As the man charged with recovering funds from the Lendy wreckage, Webb, a crocodile tear welling up in his eye, pronounced that “P2P lending, from my perspective, is dead”.

For his “perspective” read, “from the point of view of one whose main professional interaction is with patients who are dead, or nearly dead”. It’s like asking an undertaker who will win a marathon. We called Mr. Webb out on the same material nearly two years ago [1], and yet the record hasn’t changed.

Yes, Lendy was an appalling car crash which should never have been allowed to happen. But we (along with other informed commentators on P2P, such as 4thWay) were calling out Lendy’s bad practices long before they came to Mr. Webb’s professional attention.

In fact, long before they appeared on the administrator’s slab, 4thWay actually refused to list Lendy among the P2P institutions they commented on, citing “lack of access and little information about its processes, performance, people and legal structure. Its publicly provided information left a lot to be desired and serves as a warning to prospective lenders attracted by high interest rates and vague concepts of property security” [2].

Mr Webb’s pronouncements at the Insolvency Practitioners’ jamboree were reported in an article entitled ‘The downfall of P2P lending: self-valuation, excess capital and no experience’ [3] and described “the shocking details of how the once booming P2P property lending market collapsed”.

By “collapsed”, he of course means that, of the scores [4] of regulated P2P lenders, 26 have withdrawn from the market and only 8 of those actually went down owing money to investors. Of the remaining 18, three switched to institutional only lending, three changed to a new business model, four were sold and their new owners discontinued P2P operations and 8 decided voluntarily to close down. But only 8 actually went bust [5].

Of course, that’s eight more than anyone would like – and we truly feel for those who lost money to these bad platforms – but to suggest this represents a “collapse” of the industry is playing fast and loose with the facts. We would expect better of a financial professional.

And in his cataloguing of this “collapse” he somehow neglects to mention the many thousands of homes that would never have been built if P2P hadn’t stepped into the breach to help fund the building industry after the banks stopped lending in 2008. CapitalStackers has been instrumental in raising the money to build 118 houses and 433 apartments.

Webb cites the platforms’ withdrawal as “natural selection for the benefit of the market because the poor players are effectively being killed off because they are not competitive”, as if such a process is a unique feature of P2P. It’s not, of course.

Banks have gone bust, institutional lending operations have gone bust. So have newspapers, supermarkets, lawyers, accountants and even insolvency practitioners [6]. Badly-run, uncompetitive or ill-prepared companies in every industry have gone bust owing money – yet no one is writing about the death of supermarkets or accountants. Or even, dare we say it, insolvency practitioners.

So clearly Mr. Webb has an agenda, and to this Damian, all omens are bad. A man with the gift of hindsight is presuming to tell us the future.

He wipes a few smudges and finger marks off his crystal ball and pontificates that, “I think there will be more failures in that P2P space, but it has largely been fixed or closed down by the Financial Conduct Authority” [7].

Again, this is ill-informed. The tweak to the regulations imposed an obligation that retail investors must pass an “appropriateness test” and, in the absence of taking independent advice, limit their lending to 10% of their investments until sufficiently experienced (which equates to lending on two deals within the last two years) at which point they could change their status from “Restricted” to “Sophisticated”, for P2P purposes. Those platforms that voluntarily left the regulated space did so because the regulations were too much of a faff – but they weren’t “regulated out”. They simply weren’t committed enough to go the extra mile and left the business to those that were.

At this point of his speech, Dr. Hindsight may have managed the kind of frosty smile that killed off all the houseplants in the building and mustered an attempt at cheeriness – “There are a number of operators in that space that will do well. They are well run, they’ve got a good client base and they will continue” – Gee, thanks Damian – “but the market is moving very much towards alternative lending out of institutional funds” – Oh.

So then the man who has no professional knowledge of healthy P2P companies went on to proclaim that, “The future is alternative lending – P2P may be an aspect of that but it’s going to be a very small aspect”.

What exactly does this endgame specialist know about institutional funds? Or lending in general, for that matter (apart from the kind that’s ossified into terminal debt). Does he follow the view of some investors that the mere presence of an institution in a deal gives them comfort because people who deal in finance must ipse facto understand all forms of finance? Does he think the institutional lenders have some sort of expertise in property lending that would have prevented the Lendy bellyflop?

Well, they might have done, not because they understand property debt, but because they can smell the stench of bad practice.

But why on earth Webb feels institutional lenders are “the future” is an unsolved mystery. True, a few platforms have found them to be a useful source of funding fast growth, but at CapitalStackers we’ve only proceeded down that route (as indeed we do all routes) with caution, because our retail investors are so important to us. And since stability outweighs speed of growth in our book, we haven’t been in a hurry to secure a large institution’s funds. We’re not against an institutional tie up. Far from it – just as long as it doesn’t cut across our highly valued relationship with our existing investors who, after all, have been with us from the get-go.

On the other hand, we do work hand in hand with banks on almost every deal, which is an institutional partnership of a different kind. While we’re regulated by the FCA, banks, for their part, are subject to very high standards of regulatory control through the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority, which tightened controls further after 2008. In effect, this means banks can only lend up to around 60% Loan-to-Value ratio, otherwise they require more regulatory capital and business becomes less economical.

Which is the basis of our business model – funding the gap between a property developer’s equity and the amount it’s economical for the banks to lend – which is a sensible position for crowdfunding. Small investors who prefer not to tie their capital up in REITS or unit trusts can get involved in the kind of regulated, transparent deals that banks normally fund. This gives them more choice and flexibility. Not to mention the confidence generated by a deal fully funded from the outset.

And yes, this means we take a junior position in the “stack” to our bank partners, but this is a calculated and painstakingly assessed risk. Whilst in the repayment cascade the bank would be out first, it’s worth pointing out that they would never enter into a deal with a junior lender where they expected that junior lender to go into default, since this would also cause issues with their own deal.

Anyway, continuing to paint a portrait of the entire industry through his keyhole, Dr. Hindsight goes on to explain that the “historic failures in P2P lending over the last decade” (all eight of them) were all down to “shareholder greed, too much capital, using technology to cut out credit risk processes, and lack of experience in lending”. Furthermore, he states that “many of the people involved in fintech were more technology than finance-based, they had no financial background,” tarring the entire seagoing fleet with the same brush he used to damn the few that sank.

“There was no grey hair”, he goes on (boy does he go on!), “there was no experience, people just jumped into the sector, worked out there was an ability to deploy money and did so with minimal review of credit or understanding of lending.

“And they went into areas I think they deemed to be simplistic, i.e. property lending, but they didn’t really understand the issues involved.”

Which, to be honest, sounds a bit like, dare we say it, an insolvency practitioner predicting the future of an entire industry when he doesn’t understand the issues involved.

The above litany is nothing like our experience. In fact, it pretty much describes the opposite of the CapitalStackers business model. As catalogued by 4thWay, our shareholders’ demands are modest. Where there is still hair, it is grey. The experience of our directors’ spans decades of specialist property lending in major banks. Our credit processes are not automated, but still go through the time-proven process of staring into the borrower’s eyes and seeing his very soul (plus a lot of exhaustive financial modelling, independent surveys and information sharing with banks). And while we’ve had no difficulty raising funds for the kind of deal we publish (we recently broke our own record, raising half a million pounds in under a minute), deep due diligence into the quality of the deals is more important to us than the need to deploy vast amounts of capital quickly.

In other words, it doesn’t matter how much capital we have – if the deal doesn’t get through our narrow gates, that capital ain’t getting deployed.

So the suggestion that the kind of serious property lenders who form the backbone of this industry would “run roughshod over credit processes and standard banking processes that had been in place for years, creating significant value for themselves in the business but at significant expense of the retail investors investing into the platforms” would be libellous if they weren’t clearly the words of someone suffering from insolvency practitioner’s myopia.

The future of property-based P2P, Mr, Webb, cannot be borne on the broad shoulders of institutions alone. Yes, they bring a source of capital (in return for a steady income) – but if they had lending expertise, they would do it themselves. This is why they come to the P2P platforms in the first place. No, the future, as ever, is partnership – a marriage of resources and skills, with each team member bringing their best game.

As the interlopers and charlatans get weeded out, the field will be left to experienced property lenders, well-versed in banking best practices, lending on high quality deals with appropriate LTV ratios and maintaining complete transparency in all areas and at all stages with their investors. They will happily work with regulators, banks and investment institutions to create the best of all possible worlds for all investors, borrowers and, of course, the many happy people who benefit from the homes they help to build.

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CapitalStackers investors pledged the best part of £1 million in just a few days to part fund the development costs of 48 apartments for the Over-55s in Thornton Cleveleys, standing to make returns from 10.21% to 14.66% at a Loan to Value of 65.6% on the highest risk layer.

The scheme is targeted at downsizers who’d like to be part of a community, and the developers – Torsion Care Ltd – are creating a highly desirable “Silver Village”, with communal lounges, gardens, a twin-bed guest suite and 5-day concierge service. It’s appealingly sited next to a bowling green, playing fields and the Marsh Mill Shopping Village with all the amenities the residents might need close by. It’s the final segment of a larger development of forty 2-5 bedroom houses and is priced below a similar recently completed McCarthy & Stone project in Poulton-le-Fylde, two miles away which has already sold 44 out of 50 apartments.

The scheme comprises 32 one bed and 16 two bed apartments, and while the one acre site only allows for 26 car spaces, there’s ample free parking in the surrounding roads. It’s also very well connected – 5 miles from Blackpool, 17 miles from Preston and just 10 minutes from the M55, which links to the M6 and beyond.

The Deal

Senior debt of £4,546,000 is being provided by United Trust Bank at a Loan to Value ratio of 50% at an interest rate of 6.5%. The borrower owns the site having put equity of almost £1.1 million into the scheme.

CapitalStackers invited bids for slices of the £960,000 loan, which were fully sold out in five days on Agreed Bids – meaning the investors offered the borrower a discount on its target rate.

The annualised returns were therefore agreed in the following risk bands:

Layer 3 – 14.66%

Layer 2 – 11.75%

Layer 1 – 10.21%

And the borrower benefits from the reduced rate of 14.05% instead of the 15.00% target.

Torsion Group’s credentials for this project are strong. They have a track record in building retirement apartment schemes for third parties such as Morgan Sindall Later Living and Cinnamon Care. Launching in 2015, they’ve grown quickly from a turnover of £19m to £50m with consistent profitability, cash reserves of £1.75m and no company debt. They employ 58 staff and will subcontract this project to a local builder, Melrose Construction Ltd who’ll put up a 10% performance bond. Melrose have sound experience of building in the area and have constructed 40 houses on the adjacent site.

The Loan to Value ratio at 65.6% for Layer 3 gives a comfortable cushion to investors and is based on the sensitivity assumption that 21 apartments will be sold in the 5 months after practical completion with a build period extended by one month to 18 months to allow for any construction delays. It means sales values would have to fall by more than 34.4% before impacting top layer investors. In the event that properties remain unsold, the net rental income should easily allow the borrower to refinance the completed scheme with a long term mortgage.

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Who came up with the wheeze for housebuilders to retain freeholds on the sale of a house and charge the new leasehold owner a (seemingly innocuous) ground rent that doubles every ten years? And how did they get away with it?

It’s a game that will soon be up when legislation outlaws the practice, following a passionate crusade by the National Leasehold Campaign (NLC).

But some beneficiaries of this large and lucrative industry are still unwilling to acknowledge its demise. Just to be clear, the beneficiaries are generally: (1) housebuilders who sell only the leasehold to new homeowners, retaining the freehold to sell at a further profit, and; (2) the companies who buy those freeholds and are then free to charge homeowners ground rent and “management” fees at whatever level they choose to set.

Unfortunately, despite the protests, this is hardly a new story. The battle has been long and nasty. The Guardian kicked up a fuss about it over three years ago, spotlighting a company called E&J Estates, which it found is one of “an extraordinary web of 85 ground rent companies” owning the freeholds of more than 40,000 homes across England and Wales”. You may like to read it before continuing [Ref1], but I’ll summarise below.

At that time, The Guardian reported, this entire empire was controlled by a sole director named as James Tuttiett. Just one of Tuttiet’s companies, SF Funding Ltd, showed an £80m jump in the value of its ground rents from the previous year, taking turnover to £267.4m. That’s just one company reportedly owned and run by this one man.

“An unjustifiable way to print money” – Sajid Javed

His leaseholders (and lest we forget, these are people who have bought their own homes, usually taking on a big mortgage to do so), have not entered into any voluntary agreement with Tuttiett, but are obliged to either pay him ground rent or hand over the deeds to their home. The scandal came to light as momentum grew behind the NRC campaign and complaints from residents allegedly approached “panic” levels at the realisation that, even after they had fully paid off their mortgages, many of them would still be paying tens of thousands of pounds a year to live in their own homes after retirement [Ref1, para 8]. Others have complained that the exponential escalation will make their homes unsaleable in a few years, since what buyer would take on such a mounting burden? [Ref1, para 9] It’s been likened to an arranged marriage – except you can’t get an amicable divorce.

As Katie Kendrick of the NLC says, “England and Wales are among the last countries in the world where you can buy a property, but don’t ever own it. People’s homes should be theirs alone and not an asset for people to invest in and trade. That is the position elsewhere in the world”.

It’s a scandal that prompted Sajid Javed to comment on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, “Enough is enough. These practices are unjust, unnecessary and need to stop,” adding that the methods used were “an unjustifiable way to print money”.

But further investigation reveals that E&J are far from the only floater in the pool. Even a cursory trawl of TrustPilot will show levels of dissatisfaction in some of these companies that would make it impossible for them to continue if their “customers” were not bound to them for life [Ref2]. And there are literally hundreds of these companies, all making easy money without creating a penny of extra value for their inmates.

Because of course, the chiselling doesn’t stop at the ground rents. No sirree. To misquote Teddy Roosevelt, when you’ve got them by the balls, you can empty their pockets. E&J charges its leaseholders fees for such “services” as allowing them to sublet, or add patios and conservatories to their own homes [Ref1, para 19]. An Englishman’s home, it seems, is not his castle if there’s a robber baron in a bigger castle taking his cut.

And when I say easy money, you will be alarmed, gentle reader, at quite how easy it is to turn a buck in this gilded world. Buying up ground rents from new-build homes is arguably a better investment than gold: it brings a steady income stream, you never have a bad debt (you can simply turf the owner out of his home and flog it to pay your own bill) and you don’t have to provide even a half decent service because… well, see above.

Which means the banks have historically fallen over themselves to lend money to these neo-feudal barons at ultra-low interest rates. Tuttiett, for instance, managed to borrow £128 million at a reported rate of 0.95% (although admittedly the actual rate he’s paying is probably a shadehigher) [Ref1, para 13].

So it should come as a surprise to no-one that the Competition and Markets Authority is now taking enforcement action against the most prominent offenders [Ref5].

Better still, the campaign and its surrounding furore have led directly to changes in the Help to Buy Scheme – which in turn has forced five of the UK’s biggest housebuilders to scrap ground rents on new flats, and to desist from selling-on freeholds.

“Developers have not taken this decision because it’s the right thing to do” points out Katie Kendrick. “They are being forced to change their poor practices because the applications for the new Help to Buy scheme opens from the 16th December and Homes England have stipulated that ground rent charged must not exceed a peppercorn.”

So where appeals to their conscience have failed to move the big housebuilders, financial constraint appears to be having an effect. There’s still a long way to go to dismantle this distasteful practice, but the first bricks have been chipped from the wall.

Are we anti-developer?  Is a weather vane anti-wind?

Of course, some freeholders have put on a good show of acting surprised, even going so far as to accuse us of being anti-developer, merely for pointing out which way the wind is blowing. Is a weathervane anti-wind?

We’re highlighting this because it is going to happen. It’s quite simply our job to know the direction of travel and alert developers to take care what they spend on sites going forward. Freehold owners may carp and cavil (and by golly they will) and protest that the practice isn’t as widespread as people think; that most captive leaseholders must be content with their lot because they haven’t yet risen up and put the freeholders’ head on a pikestaff. But of course, when you ask them for hard figures, or details about these happy leaseholders, they ooze away into the darkness again. And anyway – what leaseholder will put his head above the parapet when his balls are in a vice? The Guardian itself cited difficulty in putting names to quotes since many people trapped by ground rents prefer to remain anonymous while they negotiate.

However – leasehold reform has been on the agenda for quite a time now and has gathered pace as awareness burgeoned in the last couple of years. In July, the Law Commission unveiled a comprehensive set of measures to give leaseholders the full rights to the homes they paid for. The NLC’s submissions persuaded the body to endorse reforms it had previously ruled out, extending the benefits to even more leaseholders. The government’s senior legal advisors went as far as recommending that commonhold, a scheme for the freehold ownership of flats successful in other parts of the world, be the “preferred alternative” to leasehold.

So those in the know generally expect ground rents to be capped or abolished altogether. We have a government with a substantial majority, 4 years remaining in office and this is a popular, vote-winning policy. With a senior housing minister using words like “unscrupulous” and “pernicious”, the writing is very much on the wall. Developers and their funders will have to adjust. Most have already.

So let us lay our cards on the table. At CapitalStackers, we are proactively, practically and passionately pro-developer. Many developments simply wouldn’t happen without our advice and service, which is more than can be said for the ground rents “industry”. We put together deals that work and otherwise might fail. Our pricing is fair and market-driven, so that both developers and investors come back time and again to us.

But we’re also pro doing the right thing. If Mrs Miggins is being fleeced simply for living in her home, we don’t want a part of it, so in our view, regulation is no bad thing.

Thus, we can safely say that none of our developer clients has sold houses on leasehold in order to extract more profit by packaging and selling the ground rents.  The law will prevent it in the future anyway, not that they would consider it. We’d like to think they share our values of fair play.

In the interests of open declaration, we do have clients who’ve built flats and sold leaseholds to buyers, packaging and selling ground rents to a freehold investor because that was the accepted practice at the time. But again, we can state honestly that none of these clients would have entertained onerous leasehold terms.

We, and the senior lenders with whom we collaborate on deals (i.e. banks), have not incorporated the capital value of ground rent sales in development appraisals for some time now – mainly because proposed legislation could wipe out the value. It would be lunacy to lend against it. It’s unfortunate for those developers who have bought sites on the expectation of selling ground rents, but that’s commercial life. There is some comfort in the fact that ground rents aren’t normally a significant part of a project’s Gross Development Value.

The likelihood is that legislation will force ground rents down to zero. As that happens, the Residual Site Value will fall and developers will adjust the amount they pay for sites. There will be a relatively short-term adjustment period for developers.

Our developer clients’ interests are perfectly aligned with ours – in that they too want to produce stock that will sell.

That means it must be mortgageable.

When this situation started unfolding, led by the Nationwide Building Society, mortgage providers changed their lending policy en masse. Almost overnight, they refused to lend against leasehold security where the ground rent was more than 0.1% of the capital value of the property. This left thousands of owners unable to sell because buyers couldn’t get a mortgage. This, of course, included some of their own existing customers – so ironically, they were already lending against property they wouldn’t lend against for a new buyer! Doh!

However, even today, some freehold buyers are still putting out terms which will fail this basic 0.1% mortgage criterion. Are they really that naïve? We’re in the golden age of disruption. There’s now a perfect opportunity for them to set out their stall to offer fair pricing, exceptional service and best-in-class communication. To swap avarice for an enhanced reputation and treat their captive audience with the humanity everyone deserves. We hope more and more of them will.

So we’re shining the spotlight on how we got to where we are now, what’s currently happening and trying to join the dots to work out how it will unfold. And that’s not difficult. Here are our top tips for developers:

  1. If you build houses – only ever sell your buyers the freehold.
  2. If you build apartments, work on the basis that ground rent will be nil. If it turns out to be more, doubtful though that is, it’s bunce. Until there is absolute clarity, don’t factor ground rents into your development appraisal – and buy sites based on the resulting residual site value.
  3. Keep up to speed with the Law Commission and Government progress.
  4. Steal a march on the competition and only sell leasehold interests on fair, buyer-friendly and, above all, mortgageable terms.
  5. If you have to sell the freehold to investors, limit yourselves to the reputable ones – those with a decent score on TrustPilot. A leaseholder can’t choose their landlord. They’re stuck with them for evermore, unless they band together and buy out the freehold.
  6. Anticipate that the proposed Commonhold alternative will be adopted at some time in the future.

All the above will enhance your reputation in the residential development world. You’ll become one of the ‘good guys’ and make your finished properties easier to sell. And that’s great for you, your funders and Mrs Miggins.

Everyone wins, except the Robber Barons.

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It’s often quoted that economists have predicted nine of the last five recessions. But the Cassandra tendencies of most economists are as nothing compared with those at the Bank of England, who seem to take a perverse pleasure in talking down the economy.

Last week the Old Women of Threadneedle Street predicted a 16% fall in house prices as a result of COVID 19, [1] compared with the much less hysterical figure of 7% forecast by the property market professionals (whose business depends on them getting these figures right).

Now, the Bank has never made any secret of its fondness for “cooling” the housing market (economist-speak for ‘talking down”), but why such a wild variation? A drop of 16% would compare with that of the financial crisis of 2008. However, two of the main factors which led to that historic drop – unavailability of mortgages due to the credit crunch and a lack of first time buyers – don’t apply today. Halifax and other lenders confirmed this week that mortgage products are available across a wide range of Loan-to-Values (LTV) [2] and after a pre-COVID surge in first time buyers [3], the sector came back even stronger after lockdown. The first-time buyer property portal, Share to Buy, reported its highest number of registrations in a single day following the Government’s easing of restrictions last week. [4]

Other property market professionals were similarly sanguine. MovingHomeAdvice.com said this week, “The fundamentals of the property market remain strong and with unemployment mitigated by the Government furlough scheme, cheap and available mortgage money and pent up demand from the hangover of Brexit, we argue that house-prices will not drop significantly anytime soon despite the anxiety of a market frozen by Covid 19 temporarily.” [5]

Nationwide, Halifax, Virgin and Santander have all made it easier for buyers to qualify for loans. Nationwide resumed loans at 85% LTV last Wednesday, while Halifax raised its LTV level from 80% to 85%.

Mark Harris, Chief Exec at SPF Private Clients said “Lenders are adapting and innovating,” observing that lenders have found ways to deal with some of the problems and “there is a willingness to lend. Problems have mostly centred around staff resources, handling the surge in mortgage payment holidays and those staff self-isolating who have children and no childcare”. [6]

Reflecting the general mood, Chris Sykes, mortgage consultant at broker Private Finance stated that this “is great news for the market and for borrowers who will have increased choice going forward. It also means the post-lockdown recovery should be swifter when some semblance of normality returns.” [7]

Regular readers will note that CapitalStackers anticipated a strong return to the housing market after people staring at the same four walls for two months searched for a change of scene. And sure enough, a mere two days after the housing lockdown ended, Miles Shipside, Rightmove director and housing market analyst reported: “The traditionally busy spring market was curtailed by lockdown, but we’re now seeing clear signs of returning momentum, with the existing desire to move now being supplemented by some people’s unhappiness with their lockdown home and surroundings.” Who knew? [8]

Rightmove recorded a 45% jump in visits on Wednesday following the Government’s lockdown-lift announcement on Tuesday, along with a 70% increase in email enquiries about viewings and 2,115 new property listings during the first five hours of trading yesterday. [9]

So where does the Bank of England wring its pessimism from? Might it be the Daily Mail, who wailed this week, “Desperate sellers are dropping the prices of their homes after a glut of properties flooded onto websites today as Britain’s housing market was reopened in a bid to get the country moving again during the lockdown.” [10] Well, yes – it’s undeniable that the number of houses increased when the block was lifted, but even the greenest of new estate agents would not call it a “glut”, any more than taking one’s thumb off a hosepipe could be called a flood.

But such figures would need to be rooted in reality, and the roots of the Bank’s mathematics would seem to be on rocky ground. Predictions of house price falls are realistically based on reports from estate agents of the actual discounts buyers ask for when they make an offer.

And the reality is that in March – according to Liam Bailey, Global Head of Research at Knight Frank – homes were sold on average for 98% of their asking price. Since then, sellers have been accepting offers at 94% of the asking price – a further drop of just four per cent. A far cry from the Bank’s extravagant 16%. [11]

To facilitate a drop of such magnitude would require buyers and mortgage lenders reluctant to take part  – neither of which seems to be happening – and those sellers already on the market becoming so desperate that they’re willing to accept such insulting offers, rather than just sitting tight and waiting for the generally predicted rise next year.

“The key question is,” says Bailey, “Will vendors accept discounts of more than five per cent? Some will, but there is growing evidence from the widening spread between average offers and the offers that are being accepted, that many simply won’t.

“If we add into the mix the fact that we have low new-build rates coming through in 2020, low inventory and low interest rates, it becomes less likely we will see significant further falls from here.”

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